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CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-THE 
ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
SECTION FIVE 
Michael P. Zuckert* 
None of the many debates on the original intentions of the 
framers of the fourteenth amendment can have quite the interest of 
the one in the House of Representatives in 1871, about five years 
after the amendment was drafted. The debaters included some of 
the framers of the amendment, including John Bingham, the man 
sometimes called the "James Madison of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment" for his role in drafting it. This debate on the original inten-
tion of the amendment was prompted by a bill to control the Ku 
Klux Klan in the South. The bill asserted congressional power to 
reach private conduct under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment, which declares that "Congress shall have the power to en-
force by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article." The 
Supreme Court was later to hold that Congress lacked such power, 
in a series of decisions culminating in the Civil Rights Cases.1 Much 
of the debate on the bill concerned the scope of congressional 
power. 
The 1871 debate, so far as it was concerned with the historical 
issue of original intent, turned on the relation between an earlier 
proposed amendment by Bingham, and the formula finally adopted. 
The earlier draft, introduced in both Houses of Congress in Febru-
ary 1866 by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, provided that 
[t]he Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper to secure to citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of citizens in 
the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the 
rights of life, liberty, and property. 
Where the February draft directly empowers Congress, the final 
• Professor of Political Science, Carleton College. 
I. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 
(1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542 (1876); United States v. Reese, 92 
U.S. (2 Otto) 214 (1876). Cf also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), especially the 
opinions of Justices Clark and Brennan. 
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version contained a series of limitations on the states. This differ-
ence, not surprisingly, attracted the most attention in the 1871 
debates. 
Two opposing positions on the relation between the drafts 
emerged in the 1871 debates, each held by men involved in the 
adoption of the amendment. John F. Farnsworth, a Republican of 
Illinois, took the position that the final version was a complete repu-
diation of the February draft; whereas the February draft might 
well support the KKK Bill, the amendment as adopted could not: 
"The first section of the Amendment requires no legislation; 'it is a 
law unto itself'; and the Courts can execute it. . . . It is very clear to 
my mind that the only 'legislation' we can do is to 'enforce' the 
provisions of the Constitution upon the laws of the state."2 
Bingham disagreed. Not only did the postwar amendments 
provide, in Bingham's view, power to pass the KKK Bill, but he 
went so far as to say of the relation between the earlier and later 
versions of the amendment: 
The gentleman [Farnsworth] says that amendment differs from the amendment re-
ported by me in February; differs from the provision introduced and written by me, 
now in the fourteenth article of amendments. It differs in this: that it is, as it now 
stands in the Constitution, more comprehensive than as it was first proposed and 
reported in February, 1866. It embraces all and more than did the February 
proposition. 3 
The vast literature on the original intent of the fourteenth 
amendment has failed to resolve this dispute. Some scholars side 
with Bingham,4 others with Farnsworth. Most of these opinions 
were based on cursory examination of the evidence, however. No-
body has yet explained just why the February draft was changed 
and what this change means for congressional power under the 
amendments To answer these questions, this article will survey the 
2. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., H. P. app. 117 (1871). This can be found in 
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT DEBATES (A. Avins ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as 
Avins]. 
3. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 83 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
509. 
4. H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 65, 217 (1908). J. 
TEN BROEK, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 200-205, 
(1951), takes essentially the same position. See a/so R. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 
34-53 (1960). 
5. It will be inconvenient to present here the grounds for dissatisfaction with the ex-
isting studies, but I will do so in the text as appropriate. Notice might now be taken, how-
ever, of the work of Alfred Avins, especially The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected 
Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 331 (1967), which 
probably comes closer in scope to the present study than any of the other literature. I shall 
disagree strongly with the conclusions of Avins's study. One of the chief reasons for this 
disagreement is Avins's ignoring the speech, quoted above, in which Bingham claims the final 
draft encompasses all and more than did the February draft. /d. at 338-46. He makes the 
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evidence from 1866 and 1871. 
I. THE 1866 DEBATES 
On February 26, Bingham introduced his draft for an amend-
ment on behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. After a 
debate spread over the next two days, Roscoe Conkling, Republican 
of New York, member of the Joint Committee, rose to move that 
the draft amendment be postponed. Conkling's motion carried by a 
vote of 110-37 (with 36 not voting). That was the last either House 
of Congress saw of that particular draft amendment. The Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction soon began work once more on a 
draft amendment which resulted in section one of the fourteenth 
amendment as it now stands. 
In 1871, Farnsworth and his supporters relied heavily on this 
vote to postpone the February draft. Here is Farnsworth: 
What was the fate of that amendment? ... But few speeches were made on it, and 
nearly all of them against it. . . . 
But then, by the concerted action of the Republicans, it was given its quietus 
by a postponement for two months, where it slept the sleep that knows no 
waking .... 
And thus ended the attempt to give to Congress the power which is claimed for 
it by this bill. 6 
James Garfield, Republican of Ohio, a little later in the debate, said 
much the same thing. 1 Both Farnsworth and Garfield suggest then 
that the shift to the "No state shall ... "language was prompted by 
the virtual rejection of the language directly empowering congres-
sional action. 
In reply, Bingham called attention to another motion, which 
Farnsworth and Garfield had mentioned only in passing: 
same omission in his "State Action" and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 MERCER L. REV. 
352, 355-56 (1966). My conclusions as to the proper scope of congressional power under the 
amendment will be very similar to those of R. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 43, but I shall arrive 
there by a quite different, and I think, better paved route. Harris's conclusions were taken 
over by Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private 
Acts, 73 YALE L. J. 1353 (1964). Frantz argues that the Supreme Court in the line of cases 
leading up to the Civil Rights Cases actually adopted what I will call in the text the state 
failure doctrine, a conclusion which I believe to be mistaken; but the doctrine Frantz attrib-
utes to the Court is much the same as the one I argue to be the original understanding. 
6. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H.P. app. 115 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
506. 
7. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 151 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
527. Cf J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 90 (1956). A great 
weakness of ten Broek's account is that he ignores this vote to postpone. J. TEN BROEK, 
supra note 4, at 202-03. He writes as though there was merely "a shift" in the language of the 
amendment, without at all bringing out the fact that this vote preceded and to some extent 
caused the shift. 
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That amendment [the February draft] never was rejected by the House or Senate. 
A motion was made to lay it on the table, which was a test vote on the merits of it, 
and the motion failed--«~ly forty-one YOtes for the motion, and one hundred and 
ten against it. I consented to and voted for the motion to postpone it till the second 
Tuesday of April. Afterward, in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, I intro-
duced this amendment, in the precise form, as I have stated, in which it was re-
ported, and as it now stands in the Constitution of my country. 8 
In effect then, one side took the motion to table as the "test 
vote on its merits" while the other side focused on the vote to post-
pone. I shall argue that the actual voting, and the events leading up 
to the voting, support Bingham's interpretation, at least so far as he 
claims that the vote to postpone was not tantamount to a rejection 
of his draft, and therefore was not an authoritative statement on the 
extent of congressional legislative powers. 
A. THE VOTE TO TABLE 
The vote on the motion to table failed by a very large margin, 
as Bingham said. He did not mention, however-Garfield remedied 
the omission immediately-that the motion to table was made by 
Charles Eldridge, a Wisconsin Democrat, and that "[o]f course the 
majority did not allow it to be laid on the table on motion of a 
member of the opposite party."9 
TABLE I: PARTY VOTE ON FEBRUARY DRAFTw 
Vote to Table 
(Feb. 28, 1866) 
Vote to Postpone 
(Feb. 28, 1866) 
% Republicans Supporting• 
2.8 
95.3 
*The percentages are of those actually voting on the measure. 
% Democrats Supporting 
96.8 
6.7 
8. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong. 1st Sess. H. P. app. 83 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
509. Most of those scholars who agree with Farnsworth also tend to ignore this vote. Cf 
Avins, "State Action" and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 5, at 355. 
9. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 151. (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
527. (Garfield). 
10. I have used the following principles in classifying the Representatives by party: 
(I) All Congressmen listed as Republican for this session of Congress in the Congres-
sional Quarterly's Members of Congress 1789-1970 have been counted as Republicans. 
(3) All Congressmen listed as Union Republicans (five in all) have also been counted as 
Republicans. 
(3) Two Congressmen listed as Radical Republicans have likewise been counted as 
Republicans. These two and also the five Union Republicans voted as Republicans, that is, 
voted for Schuyler Colfax, in the election for Speaker of the House. 
(4) Three of the four Congressmen-all from Missouri-who were listed as Radicals, 
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Table I shows that the vote was indeed a party vote, approxi-
mately ninety-seven percent of the voting Democrats favoring the 
motion, while only about three percent of the voting Republicans 
favored it. It is note quite true, however, that, as Farnsworth said 
in 1871, "every Republican, I believe, [voted] against laying it on 
the table by a general understanding; Mr. Conkling, Mr. Hale, Mr. 
Davis, and Mr. Hotchkiss with the rest."II The men named by 
Farnsworth were those Republicans who, according to Farnsworth, 
had spoken against the February draft during the earlier debate on 
February 26-28, 1866. Their vote on the motion to table surely 
could not be interpreted as a favorable vote on the merits of the 
draft amendment. 
Farnsworth was somewhat mistaken, however, about the vote: 
neither all the Republicans, nor even all those individuals men-
tioned by him, opposed the Democrat Eldridge's motion. Indeed, 
six Republican and Union Party members voted, contrary to their 
party position, for the motion to table. Table II identifies, with two 
exceptions which are explained in Appendix I, this group of Repub-
licans and Unionists who supported the Democratic motion. They 
have been called the "opponents test case bloc," since they broke 
party lines to vote on the merits. 
Those included in the "opponents test case bloc" supported the 
amendment in its final form while opposing the earlier form. For 
these six, at least, perhaps the difference between the two versions 
was real and sufficed to overcome their earlier opposition.12 There 
is reason to doubt that two of the six, Phelps and Hale, were af-
fected by the change of language. Phelps consistently opposed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, suggesting that his final vote for the four-
teenth amendment was not prompted by personal sympathy for its 
have also been counted as Republicans. The fourth Radical, Noell, has not been included 
among the Republicans, for he did not vote with that party on the election for Speaker. 
(5) All Democrats so-called were counted as Democrats. 
(6) The one Union Democrat also was counted as a Democrat. He voted for James 
Brooks, the Democratic candidate for Speaker. 
(7) All Congressmen listed simply as Union or Union War (six) have not been counted 
for either party. 
(8) The one Radical not included with the Republicans, and the three Whigs, and one 
Conservative have not been included with either party. Helpful statements on the political 
party situation at the time of the 39th Congress are M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE Of PRIN· 
CIPLE (1974), and G. MAYER, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 1854-1966 (2d ed. 1967). 
II. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 115 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
506. Davis of New York was actually of the Union Party, but his voting behavior, with the 
exception of this case, generally followed Republican patterns. 
12. For a somewhat contrary interpretation, see H. FLACK, supra note 4, at 83. His 
interpretation, however, is based on a rather strained reading of remarks by Bingham and 
Rogers during debate on the final draft. 
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TABLE II: OPPONENTS "TEST CASE" BLOC: 
14TH AMENDMENT VOTES 
I. II. III. 
**Hale (Rep., N.Y.) Yea Not Yea 
Voting 
Kuykendall (Rep., 111.) Yea Yea Yea 
Davis (Union, N.Y.) Yea Yea Yea 
Marvin (Union, N.Y.) Yea Not Yea 
Voting 
**Phelps (Union War, Md.) Yea Nay Yea 
*Rollins (Rep., N.H.) Not Yes Not 
Voting Voting 
•see Appendix I 
**Questionable case - see text 
Vote I - vote on motion to table February draft 
Vote II -vote (final) on House version of 14th Amendment 
IV. 
Yea 
Yea 
Nay 
Yea 
Yea 
Yea 
Vote III - vote (final) on Senate version of 14th Amendment (with citizenship clause added 
and changes in sections 2-4) 
Vote IV -vote on motion to postpone, February 28, 1866 
aims.'3 During the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1876, Hale 
claimed to have opposed the fourteenth amendment.'4 As we shall 
see below, he explicitly denied in 1875 that the February draft and 
the final draft differed. 
Small as our test case bloc may be, its existence is of great im-
portance. Contrary to Farnsworth's suggestion in 1871, the test 
bloc and the pro-Eldridge Democrats included almost everybody 
who opposed the February draft in word or deed. Of the four Re-
publican-Union Congressmen mentioned by Famsworth-Conk-
ling, Hale, Davis, and Hotchkiss-Hale and Davis did in fact vote 
to table the draft; as we shall see later, Hotchkiss's position is far 
too complex to be characterized as opposition to the principle of the 
February draft. It is difficult to call him an opponent who buried 
his opposition in a party vote. That leaves Conkling then as the 
13. Compare roll calls of March 9, March 13, and April 7, 1866. 
14. His abstention from the roll-call on the final House version of the amendment (Vote 
II in Table II) was apparently meant as opposition to the amendment, but he perhaps misre-
membered his vote on the final Senate version (Vote III in Table II). If we are to credit his 
1875 statement at all, we must take his final support of the amendment not as an expression 
of his personal support, and thus not as a comment on the difference between it and the 
February draft, but a concession to political necessity, party pressure, or some such thing. 
CoNG. GLOBE, 43rd Cong., 2nd Sess. H. P. 979 (1875), reprinted in Avins, at 722. 
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only clear case of someone who opposed the February draft and yet 
who did not support the attempt to table it, presumably for party 
reasons. 
Notwithstanding the party character of the vote on the motion 
to table, then, the evidence suggests that it was taken to be a "test 
vote on the merits," for, with one exception, all the clear opponents 
to the draft joined in the attempt to table it. But since at least 
Conkling, and perhaps some other opponents, did not support the 
motion to table, we cannot go so far as Bingham did and hold it to 
have been an unambiguous test vote on the merits. Still, Farns-
worth and Garfield were clearly wrong to dismiss it as merely a 
party matter without any evidentiary value whatever. 
B. THE VOTE TO POSTPONE 
As Bingham considered the motion to table as the real test 
vote, so Garfield and Farnsworth considered the vote to postpone. 
And just as the party character of the division on the first motion 
detracted from its quality as a test vote, the party character of the 
second vote does the same. For the vote on the motion to postpone, 
as Table I indicates, was also very much a party vote, ninety-five 
percent of the voting Republicans favoring it, and ninety-three per-
cent of the Democrats opposing it. 
Before we attempt to interpret the significance of the main-
stream party vote, let us look once more at those who deviated from 
party voting patterns. 
Only five Republicans voted against both their party's motion 
to and the previous motion to table. Table III contains these five. 
For reasons explained in Appendix II, the table also includes two of 
the three Republicans who, after voting on the motion to table, did 
not vote on the motion to postpone. The seven Republicans who 
failed to vote with the majority of their party can be seen as a bloc 
who viewed the motion to postpone as a test vote on the merits, and 
used the opportunity to express their support for the draft. 
One small group of Republican and Union Congressmen fairly 
clearly supported the February draft. Another small group fairly 
clearly opposed the February draft. But, alas, less is known about 
the views of the great mass of Republican-Union Party members 
who in February voted down Eldridge's motion to table, carried 
Conkling's motion to postpone, and later supplied the decisive votes 
for the final draft of the fourteenth amendment. Some inferences 
about this large group are supportable, however. On the vote to 
postpone, everybody, without exception and including Bingham 
himself, who had spoken for the draft, joined in the vote to post-
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TABLE III: SUPPORTERS TEST CASE BLOC: 
14TH AMENDMENT VOTES 
I. II. III. 
Julian (Rep., Ind.)• Nay Not Yea 
Voting 
Raymond (Rep., N.Y.)• Nay Not Yea 
Voting 
Newell (Rep., N.Y.) Nay Nay Yea 
Sloan (Rep., N.J.) Nay Nay Not 
Voting 
Williams (Rep., Pa.) Nay Nay Yea 
S. Wilson (Rep., Pa.) Nay Nay Yea 
Windom (Rep., Minn.) Nay Nay Yea 
•See Appendix II 
Vote I -vote on motion to table February draft, February 28, 1866 
Vote II - vote on motion to postpone February draft, February 28, 1866 
Vote III - final vote on House version of the 14th Amendment 
IV. 
Yea 
Yea 
Yea 
Yea 
Yea 
Yea 
Not 
Voting 
Vote IV -final vote on Senate version of 14th Amendment (with citizenship clause added) 
TABLE IV: FATE OF THE VOTES FAVORING THE 
MOTION TO T ltBLE IN THE LATER VOTE ON THE 
MOTION TO POSTPONE 
Support Oppose 
Postponement Postponement 
Number 5 31 
% of Original 13 79 
Supporters 
(total favoring tabling - 39) 
Not 
Vote 
3 
8 
pone. There is thus no evidence that support for postponement in 
itself signified opposition to the draft. 
Whatever the great body of Republican-Union votes did mean, 
it surely was not the universal understanding that, as Farnsworth 
and Garfield suggest, the vote to postpone was equivalent to con-
signing the February draft to the "sleep that knows no waking." As 
Table IV reveals, the greatest number of those who signified their 
opposition to the draft on the first vote did not vote in favor of the 
motion to postpone. They do not seem to have viewed the post-
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ponement as equivalent to the rejection they desired. And the op-
ponents of the draft, chiefly the Democrats, surely would not have 
hesitated to consign the draft to oblivion merely because it had been 
moved by a Republican. The more plausible interpretation is that 
the Democrats did not see postponement as equivalent to rejection 
at all, but as just that-the postponement, but continued life, of a 
piece of legislation they opposed. 
The evidence supplied by the roll calls is supported by what 
was said in the debates. Conkling, in making his motion, empha-
sized that agreement to his motion was not tantamount to rejection. 
He began his speech as follows: 
I have not sought the floor for the purpose of discussing the merits of this amend-
ment. It was introduced several weeks ago and considered in the committee of 
fifteen. At that time and always I felt constrained to withhold from it my support 
as one of the committee, and when the consent of the committee was given to its 
being reported I did not concur in the report. So much I deem it fair and right to 
say.I5 
Why is it "fair and right to say"? If he meant Congress to under-
stand the postponement as a rejection, why would he introduce his 
own opposition in this way? He did so because he did not wish the 
House to understand it as an effort to reject the draft. He spoke 
openly of his own position to dispel any such suspicion. The con-
clusion of his speech corroborates this directly. 
There are, Mr. Speaker, I know, a number of gentlemen upon the one side and 
the other of this question who wish further time to consider it, if not to discuss it, 
and I therefore intend, without any hostility to the gentleman who has it in charge, 
but at least, I think, by his quasi consent, to make a motion to postpone. 
Thus, he made every effort to insure that his motion not be seen as 
opposition on the merits. 
C. WHY, THEN, THE POSTPONEMENT? 
When we attempt to explain the postponement we must take 
into account the other business before the House at the time. On 
the very day the decision to postpone was taken, Thaddeus Stevens 
had interjected to call the House's attention to some pressing 
business. 
I am reminded that several of our employees get no pay because we have not passed 
the appropriation bill. If it will be agreeable to the gentleman to make his remarks a 
few days hence, I will move we now proceed to consideration of one of the appropri-
ations bills. 16 
15. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. 1094 (1866), reprinted in Avins, at 160. 
16. /d. 
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Stevens's motion was not immediately accepted, but following the 
postponement of Bingham's draft amendment the House did tum to 
the pressing appropriation bill. And there was another, even more 
pressing piece of business about to come before the House. On Feb-
ruary 2, the Senate had passed the Civil Rights Bill, and that bill 
was scheduled to come to the House floor on March 1. That Presi-
dent Johnson had just successfully vetoed the Freedman's Bureau 
Bill no doubt lent some sense of urgency to enacting some actual 
legislation to protect the freedmen. To some extent, then, we might 
attribute the postponement to the House's need to get on with very 
pressing business. 
Other constitutional amendments, most of which were later in-
corporated into the fourteenth amendment itself, were also pending. 
Joseph James suggests that some Congressmen felt that the general 
principles of the February draft, later section one of the amend-
ment, ought to wait on the provisions regarding representation, at 
that time up for consideration in the Senate.11 As is well known, 
there was an importance and urgency attributed to questions of rep-
resentation and to related, more immediately political measures. 
Conkling's comments on the desirability of postponement sug-
gest yet another explanation for that action-recall his reference to 
"the gentlemen ... who wish further time to consider it." In the 
light of the frequently noted confusions about the meaning of the 
amendment among its supporters1s and the less often-noted but 
equally confused understandings among its opponents, some time to 
"consider" more carefully the meaning of the draft must have ap-
peared very attractive. 
But the draft was not only subject to a certain variety of inter-
pretation; it was also controversial. Contrary to Farnsworth's 1871 
assertion that nearly all the speakers were against the February 
draft, the record shows a fairly even split in the main speeches. The 
neat pattern of four Republican supporters, four Republican-Union 
opponents, and two Democrats clearly indicates a prearranged 
schedule. 
Table V shows the position taken by each Congressman who 
spoke on the February draft as he announced himself, together with 
his final position on the fourteenth amendment. The table includes 
17. J. JAMES, supra note 7, at 86-87, 189. 
18. Cf C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1276-80 (1971); and Fairman, 
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 26-29 
(1949) (comments on Higby especially and even Bingham). 
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TABLE V: SPEAKERS IN THE DEBATE ON THE 
FEBRUARY DRAFT 
Speaker Position on Position on 
Feb. Draft Final 14th 
Amendment 
Bingham (Rep., Ohio) favors favors 
Higby (Rep., Cal.) favors favors 
Kelley (Rep., Pa.) favors favors 
Price (Rep., Iowa) favors favors 
Hotchkiss (Rep., N.Y.) opposes favors 
Conkling (Rep., N.Y.) opposes favors 
Davis (Union, N.Y.) opposes favors 
Hale (Rep., N.Y.) opposes rrrm 
Rogers (Dem., N.J.) opposes opposes 
Niblack (Dem., Ind.) opposes opposes 
only those who actually spoke on the bill and not those who merely 
inteijected comments from the floor. (A partial exception to this is 
Conkling, who did not, as was indicated before, actually rise to ad-
dress himself to the merits of the draft. Had the other more casual 
speakers been included, the number of those who favored the draft 
would be increased.) No matter how the speakers are tallied, how-
ever, Farnsworth's claim that "nearly all" were against it cannot be 
sustained.I9 
If Farnsworth's "nearly all" did not oppose the draft, still the 
Republican opposition was substantial enough to cause some hesita-
tion. At the least, the opposition could have dragged out the de-
bate. At the most, the opposition could have combined with the 
Democrats to secure the one-third plus one that would suffice to kill 
a constitutional amendment. That of course would have been a 
great defeat for the Republican leadership and for the Joint Com-
mittee.2o Between these two extremes, but also unappealing to the 
19. See note 14 for the explanation for Hale's being listed as questionable on the four· 
teenth amendment. Conkling, on the basis of evidence to be brought out later, ought perhaps 
to be listed as questionable also. It is interesting to note, as Table V reveals, the degree to 
which Republican and Union opposition to the February draft is centered in the New York 
delegation. Cf M. BENEDICT, supra note 10, at 1-9, on the influence of Secretary of State 
Seward in the New York delegation. 
20. It is very difficult to estimate whether the opposition to the February draft could 
ever have defeated it. The best we can do, perhaps, is to arrive at a plausible maximum 
minimum vote that could be rallied against the February draft. Of the 184 members of the 
House of Representatives, five never voted on any fourteenth amendment roll-call. We con-
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Republican Party, would be the passage of the amendment at the 
price of destroying thereby the remarkable party unity the Republi-
cans had displayed to that time. Given the political position of the 
congressional Republican Party-already at odds with the Presi-
dent, soon to be at greater odds with him; and requiring steady two-
thirds majorities both for amendments and to override possible ve-
toes-maintenance of voting cohesion was crucial.21 
D. WHY, THEN, THE SHIFf IN LANGUAGE? 
The opposition, doubts, or hesitations about the February draft 
were sufficient to lead the party to pause. Thus the postponement. 
Were they sufficient to require a new amendment? That is the key 
question. Consider Bingham's own explanation in 1871 for the 
changes he made: 
sider them nonparticipants in our hypothetical vote also. Thirty-six of the thirty-nine Demo-
crats, plus thirteen of the Republicans or of one of the smaller parties voted against the 
fourteenth amendment in some form (not counting the vote on the motion to postpone as a 
vote against the amendment). To these we can add Conkling and Hotchkiss, the two Repub-
licans who indicated their opposition to the February draft, but never voted against the four-
teenth amendment in any form. That gives a total of 51 who opposed at least one form of the 
amendment. This hypothetical "minimum" opposition would not have been nearly sufficient 
to defeat the February draft, however, for 130 remain who never opposed the amendment in 
any form. That is, the draft would have had an easy two-thirds majority, 128-51-5. Of 
course, this proves very little other than the negative proposition that we do not know from 
the evidence that the February draft could have been beaten. We do not know, of course, 
from this tally, that it could have passed, for we do not know how many of those 128 might 
also have opposed the February draft. It would have taken only nine more opponents from 
that group to deny it the needed two-thirds majority. 
The evidence certainly is not sufficient to justify James in his claims that the postpone-
ment was due to the opposition's being strong enough to defeat the draft (for which claim he 
brings forward hardly any evidence whatever besides the debates preceding the postpone-
ment) and that the postponement was generally seen to be the death of the draft (for which 
claim he brings forward only some scattered newspaper testimony). J. JAMES, supra note 7, 
at 86, 189. On the other hand, however, ten Broek in his vision of continuity between the 
February and final versions, fails to give any weight to Congress's postponement of the Feb-
ruary draft in the light of the opposition to it. Flack is in some ways the most adequate on 
the postponement, but he seems to accept the position later taken by Farnsworth (see infra) 
that if the two drafts meant to grant the same extent of Congressional power, then the change 
of form must have been mainly an attempt to deceive someone. Cf FLACK, supra note 9, at 
65, 69, SO. When such a charge was raised in 1871, Bingham strongly denied it. Apart from 
what the charge may or may not have meant as applied to Bingham himself, Flack's treat-
ment of the issue does not deal with what Congress, or the House, as a body may have 
understood itself to be doing. That is, although Bingham may have fooled them into adopt-
ing a form of language which to him meant the same thing as another form of language, what 
is it the Congressmen who were fooled believed the difference between the two forms of 
language to be? I shall show below, moreover, that Flack's treatment of the congressional 
power issue was too crude to catch the nuances of the situation, and that one need have 
recourse to nothing so gross as the deception theory to make sense of the change in the 
language, the opposition to the original form, and Bingham's insistence that the final version 
gave up nothing of the February draft's intended power. 
21. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 84 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
510. 
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But, says the gentleman [Farnsworth) to me, why did you change the amendment of 
February, 1866? Sir, I sat at the feet of one who, though departed this life, still lives 
among us in his immortal spirit, and still speaks to us from the reports of the high-
est judicial tribunal on earth, which he so long adorned as the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States ... that great man, John Marshall ... in the 
hope that by his guidance, the amendment might be so framed that in all the hereaf-
ter, it might be accepted by the historian of the American Constitution and her 
Magna Charta "as the keystone of American liberty." 
In reexamining that case of Barron [v. Baltimore), Mr. Speaker, after my strug-
gle in the House in February, 1866, to which the gentleman has alluded, I noted and 
apprehended as I never did before, certain words in that opinion of Marshall. Re-
ferring to the first eight articles of amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States, the Chief Justice said: "Had the framers of these amendments intended 
them to be limitations on the powers of the state governments they would have 
imitated the framers of the original Constitution, and have expressed that inten-
tion." Barron vs. The Mayor, & c., 7 Peters, 250. 
135 
Acting upon this suggestion I did imitate the framers of the original Constitu-
tion. As they had said "no State shall emit bills of credit, pass any bill of attainder, 
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts;" imitating their 
example, and imitating it to the letter, I prepared the provision of the first section of 
the fourteenth amendment as it stands in the Constitution .... 
I hope the gentleman now knows why I changed the form of the amendment of 
February, 1866.22 
Bingham admits here that his experience with the February 
draft was a "struggle"; the opposition aroused by the draft was a 
factor in his rethinking the amendment. Bingham's own position 
on the meaning and significance of the change contains two appar-
ently divergent views. The first we have already quoted: the final 
version contains all and more than the February draft did; it legiti-
mates legislation, such as that proposed in the KKK Bill, regulating 
private individuals. This is the proposition, of course, that Farns-
worth and Garfield were most eager to deny.23 
The other aspect of Bingham's account emerges most clearly in 
his quotation from Chief Justice Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore: 
"had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limita-
tions on the powers of the state governments they would have imi-
tated the framers of the original Constitution, and have expressed 
that intention." That can only mean that Bingham originally in-
tended his first draft to be such a limitation on the states. Bing-
ham's claim that the second draft expanded on the first would 
mean, then, that both were intended to limit the states, and that the 
second does so more effectively. Whether speaking of the draft 
which directly grants Congress the power to secure equal protec-
22. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 84 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
509-10. 
23. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. 1034 (1866), reprinted in Avins, at 150. 
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tion, and privileges and immunities, or of the draft which prohibits 
the states from abridging or denying these things, Bingham's em-
phasis was the same: congressional power to correct and penalize 
forbidden state action. 
The February draft did not aptly convey Bingham's own inten-
tion. This, I believe, is the burden of the very important interjection 
by Hotchkiss just before the vote on Conkling's motion to postpone. 
I have no doubt that I desire to secure every privilege and every right to every 
citizen in the United States that the gentleman who reports this resolution desires to 
secure. As I understand it, his object in offering this resolution and proposing this 
amendment is to provide that no state shall discriminate between its citizens and give 
one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon another. If this amendment 
secured that, I should vote very cheerfully for it today; but as I do not regard it as 
permanently securing those rights, I shall vote to postpone its consideration until 
there can be a further conference between the friends of the measure, and we can 
devise some means whereby we shall secure those rights beyond a question. 
Thus, Hotchkiss objected that the amendment did not adequately 
secure what it aimed to secure. Although he too had some remarks 
about what he saw to be an overabundance of congressional power, 
which we shall wish to discuss a bit later, the thrust of his remarks 
is somewhat different: 
Constitutions should have their provisions so plain [Hotchkiss continues] that it 
will be unnecessary for courts to give construction to them; they should be so plain 
that the common mind can understand them . 
. . . [T]he right should be incorporated into the Constitution. It should be a consti-
tutional right that cannot be wrested from any class of citizens, or from the citizens 
of any State by mere legislation. But this amendment proposes to leave it to the 
caprice of Congress; and your legislation upon the subject would depend upon the 
political majority of Congress, and not upon two-thirds of Congress and three-
fourths of the States. 
Place these guarantees in the Constitution in such a way that they cannot be 
stripped from us by accident, and I will go with the gentleman. 
I think the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Bingham] is not sufficiently radical in his 
views upon this subject. I think he is a conservative. [Laughter]24 
Hotchkiss proceeded to make a suggestion, the bearing of which 
was certainly not lost on Bingham. 
Why not provide by an amendment to the Constitution that no State shall discrimi-
nate against any class of its citizens; and let that amendment stand as a part of the 
organic law of the land. . . . 
Let us have a little time to compare our views upon this subject, and agree 
upon an amendment that shall secure beyond question what the gentleman desires 
to secure. It is with that view, and no other, that I shall vote to postpone this 
24. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. 1095 (1866), reprinted in Avins, at 
160 (emphasis supplied). 
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subject for the present. 25 
This brief speech by Hotchkiss is, I believe, of capital impor-
tance in the history of the framing of section one of the fourteenth 
amendment. It greatly influenced Bingham in his next drafting at-
tempts, for it was surely with this speech in mind that he reread 
Marshall's opinion in Barron and was struck, as never before, by 
Marshall's dictum about the proper way to draft constitutional limi-
tations. Hotchkiss's speech surely had a great influence in Con-
gress, also, helping those who did not oppose Bingham's draft to 
join in the vote for postponement by showing that the draft could be 
strengthened. No doubt the Democrats' opposition to the post-
ponement can be traced to this same thought. 
To understand even better the importance of this interjection, 
we might step back a bit to consider the situation in Congress when 
the February draft was reported to the House floor. The single 
most important fact was the pending Civil Rights Bill, itself aimed 
at overturning the so-called "Black Codes" established in the 
Southern states immediately after the war. Farnsworth, in 1871, 
expressed a very common view: 
Why, sir, we all know, and especially those of us who were members of Congress at 
that time, that the reason for the adoption of this amendment, was because of the 
partial, discriminating, and unjust legislation of those states under governments set 
up by Andrew Johnson, by which they were punishing and oppressing one class of 
men under different laws from another class. 26 
Many scholars, notably Charles Fairman, concur with Farnsworth 
that the amendment was meant chiefly as the constitutional 
equivalent of the Civil Rights Bill.27 This is an overstatement. 
Nonetheless, the Civil Rights Bill and the circumstances to which it 
was directed were very much in the minds of Congressmen as they 
considered the fourteenth amendment. The Civil Rights Bill was 
aimed at specific state and local governmental enactments, declar-
ing these void so far as they discriminated on the basis of race or 
previous condition of servitude, and setting penalties against those 
who "under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or cus-
tom," had deprived another person of any of the civil rights enu-
merated in the bill. The bill is thus clearly a "state action bill. "2s 
25. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 116 (1866), reprinted in Avins, at 
160. 
26. Fairman, supra note 18, at 137. 
27. But see Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968), and its progeny. Cf the dissent in that 
case by Justice Harlan, and the off-court reviews of the evidence by C. FAIRMAN, supra note 
18, and Caspar, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SuP. CT. REv. 89. 
28. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 115 (1866), reprinted in Avins, at 
506. Cf H. FLACK, supra note 4. 
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Bingham's draft, though providing authority for congressional 
legislation, did not directly supply authority for the kind of action 
Congress wanted to take, nor did it, as Hotchkiss pointed out, di-
rectly forbid the states from doing that which Congress thought the 
states ought not to do. Instead, it authorized, in its language if not 
its intention, a kind of legislation that neither Congress nor Bing-
ham was contemplating. Thus the mixed congressional reaction to 
Bingham's draft, a reaction that brought together the Democrats 
and some of the Republicans in common fear of the implications of 
this amendment. By showing exactly where Bingham's draft failed 
to secure its ends beyond the control of changeable congressional 
majorities, Hotchkiss pointed to a common ground on which the 
Republican Party could stand and outlined the principles later em-
bodied in the amendment in its final form, which passed both House 
and Senate with very little difficulty. Bingham is usually given, as 
he deserves, the great credit for the amendment, but Hotchkiss is 
the great unrecognized hero. In any case, it was Hotchkiss who 
took whatever sting there otherwise might have been from Conk-
ling's motion to postpone, and who therefore insured that Conk-
ling's motion would not be a test vote on the merits of the February 
draft. 
Thus, the February draft was itself intended to be chiefly a 
"state action" amendment and did not contemplate "consolidated 
government" with Congress taking over the mass of functions to 
that point carried on by the states. Why, then, did Bingham claim 
in 1871 that the amendment authorized Congress to regulate pri-
vate conduct? 
The first possibility, of course, is that Bingham was lying, 
either in 1871 when he claimed the broadest range for congressional 
power, or in 1866 when he spoke continually of reaching state ac-
tion. He was accused, in effect, of both. Farnsworth wondered if 
Bingham "put [the amendment] in different form to deceive some-
body."29 And Garfield objected to Bingham's reconstruction of the 
29. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 151 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
527. Actually, the immediate context for Garfield's remark is Bingham's objection to Gar-
field's claim that Thaddeus Stevens, in introducing the fourteenth amendment to the House, 
was referring to article one when he said that "(t]his proposition is not all that the committee 
desired." Bingham countered that this remark applied to other parts of the fourteenth 
amendment. In fact Stevens's comment cannot with certainty be attributed to any part of the 
amendment, but the context supports Bingham very strongly, for after making that remark 
he goes on to complain of the fact that the original provisions dealing with representation and 
with the Southern war debt, reported by the committee, were, to his deep chagrin, defeated in 
the Senate, and the ones reported in the final draft not as much to the committee's liking. On 
the other hand, in speaking of section one he makes no complaints whatever. Cf CoNG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. 2459 (1866), reprinted in Avins, at 212; 1. TEN BROEK, 
supra note 4, at 201. Avins, supra note 5, at 347, claims that Garfield "refutes" Bingham's 
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events of 1866 with the remark that Bingham "can make but he 
cannot unmake history."Jo Do Bingham's explanations of 1866 and 
1871 tally? 
The actual language of the February draft, of course, does go 
well beyond state action. Whatever Bingham may have had in 
mind, he spoke in terms of congressional powers. The opponents of 
the amendment, the Democrats Rogers and Niblack, the Republi-
can Hale, all pointed out that the language of the draft would coun-
tenance broad congressional action, action tending toward 
"consolidation" and so on. Bingham never denied these claims. 
That was not the way he conceived the amendment working in 
practice, but he seems to concede that in principle such a result is 
open under the amendment. Late in the debates on the February 
draft, Hale, no doubt acting out of a sense of frustration at the gap 
he and others perceived between what the amendment said and the 
kind of legislation Bingham anticipated under it, asked Bingham 
point blank, "whether in his opinion this proposed amendment to 
the Constitution does not confer upon Congress a general power of 
legislation for the purpose of securing to all persons in the several 
states protection of life, liberty and property, subject only to the 
qualification that the protection shall be equal," to which Bingham 
straightforwardly answered: "I believe it does in regard to life and 
liberty and property." So, even in 1866 Bingham conceived of the 
amendment as allowing Congress to reach private action. 
The key to Bingham's seemingly contradictory claims is his 
frequent repetition of Tocqueville's description of the American sys-
tem as "centralized government, decentralized administration." 
Although those "words of the most distinguished man who was 
ever sent hither from the Old World to make a personal observation 
of the workings of our institutions" are often on his lips, it was in 
1871, when defending the most far-reaching legislation yet contem-
plated under the amendment, that Bingham gave his fullest explica-
tion of Tocqueville's phrase. 
Do gentlemen say that by so legislating we would strike down the rights of the 
State? God forbid. I believe our dual system of government essential to our na-
tional existence. That Constitution which Washington so aptly said made us one 
people, is essential to our nationality and essential to the protection of the rights of 
all the people at home and abroad. The State governments are also essential to the 
local administration of the law, which makes it omnipresent, visible to every man 
denial that Stevens was referring to section one in his comment. The "refutation,·· however, 
consists entirely of Avins's quotation of Garfield's assertion that Stevens "did indeed speak 
specially of this very section." 
30. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 151 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
527. 
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within the vast extent of the Republic, in every place, whether by the wayside or by 
the fireside, restraining him by its terrors from the wrong, and protecting him by its 
power, in the right. 
The nation cannot be without that Constitution which made us "one people"; 
the nation cannot be without the State governments to localize and enforce the 
rights of the people under the Constitution. No right reserved by the Constitution 
to the States should be impaired, no right vested by it in the Government of the 
United States, or in any Department or officer thereof, should be challenged or 
violated. "Centralized power, decentralized administration," expresses the whole 
philosophy of the American system. 31 
This is a far cry from the "official theory of federalism. "32 What 
makes America a nation, and a great nation, according to Bingham, 
is the declaration within its Constitution of the great rights of man. 
The standards for action within the regime are national standards, 
and always were, even before the fourteenth amendment. Yet those 
standards depended for their vitality in practice only on the good-
will and honor of the states, for the original Constitution neither 
forbade the states from violating them, nor armed Congress with 
power to secure them. 
I am perfectly confident that that grant of power [to enforce by congressional legis-
lation these great principles) would have been there but for the fact that its insertion 
in the Constitution would have been utterly incompatible with the existence of slav-
ery in any State; for although slaves might not have been admitted to be citizens 
they must have been admitted to be persons. [Thus the benefits of article IV, sec-
tion 2, dealing with the privileges and immunities of citizens might have been de-
nied them, but the due process clause of the fifth amendment, declaring the right of 
all persons to "life, liberty, and property" would have applied even to slaves.] That 
is the only reason why it was not there. There was a fetter upon the conscience of 
the nation; the people could not put it there and permit slavery in any State 
thereafter. 33 
That omission, that one flaw in the original Constitution was, ac-
cording to Bingham, crucial: 
Nothing can be plainer to thoughtful men than that if the grant of power had been 
originally conferred upon the Congress of the nation, and legislation had been upon 
your statute-books to enforce these requirements of the Constitution in every State, 
that rebellion, which has scarred and blasted the land, would have been an 
impossibility. 34 
Now that slavery is dashed, Bingham saw the opportunity to "com-
31. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., lst Sess. H. P. app. 84-85 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
510-11. 
32. On the "official theory," see Diamond, What the Framers Meant by Federalism, and 
Jaffa, "Partly Federal, Partly National": On the Political Theory of the Civil War, in A NA-
TION OF STATES (R. Goldwin ed. 1974); and Zuckert, Federalism and the Constitution, in 
REVIEW OF POLITICS (forthcoming). 
33. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. 1090 (1866), reprinted in Avins, at 158. 
34. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., lst Sess. H. P. 1034 (1866), reprinted in Avins, at 150. 
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plete" the American Constitution by supplying that one want 
which, on slavery's account, it lacked. 
That completion required the effective nationalization of those 
principles upon which the unity of the nation rested. Bingham did 
not, however, believe that the national power must supplant the 
states in their ordinary custody of these national principles. The 
states need not cease making the laws that secure and regulate the 
privileges and immunities of citizens, the life, liberty, and property 
of persons. The states, then, although retaining the primary care 
for all these matters, yet are to be subject to the national standards 
as defined in the Constitution and applied by courts and Congress. 
Bingham's real drafting problem was to hit upon a formula 
which would capture this complex and difficult conception, a 
formula that would at once impose those national principles and 
standards on the states in no uncertain terms, and confer on the 
national authorities power to make those standards good if the 
states failed to discharge their initial responsibilities properly. Bing-
ham's February draft failed to convey the thought that the constitu-
tional prescription was that the states retain their original, or first 
instance powers. The final draft, helped along by Hotchkiss and 
John Marshall, conveyed his intention far better. 
Both drafts, then, were intended to remedy state failure. Thus 
it is easy to see how Bingham could both speak in terms of state 
action throughout the debate on both drafts, and also assert that 
both drafts authorized congressional legislation going beyond state 
action. The final draft conveys Bingham's idea far better. Under 
the amendment as adopted, as well as under the February draft, 
congressional remedial action may extend into the realm where the 
states themselves ordinarily operate. Congressional laws may, to 
some extent, supplant or supplement state laws in areas within the 
ordinary responsibility of the states, when the states have defaulted 
in their duties. 
We can now answer the second of our two questions: how does 
the state failure doctrine, entailing as it does congressional legisla-
tive powers to act directly on individuals if necessary, follow from 
the state action language of the fourteenth amendment? Two fairly 
simple textual arguments were frequently made during the KKK 
debates, which reveal the inadequacy of a limited state action inter-
pretation. First, the states are forbidden from abridging the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States. The 
amendment not only negatively forbids state interference with those 
privileges and immunities, but it positively affirms that privileges 
and immunities inhere in United States citizenship. The states may 
142 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:123 
not abridge those privileges and immunities, but who may act to 
secure, define, and safeguard them? Surely that government to 
whose citizenship they are incidents. Even in the absence of section 
five Congress would have implied power to act on their behalf, but 
section five makes that power quite explicit. Even the majority in 
the Slaughterhouse Cases, while drastically narrowing the privileges 
and immunities attributed to United States as opposed to state citi-
zenship, insisted that whatever privileges or immunities are incident 
to United States citizenship are thereby within the scope of congres-
sional legislation.Js 
The second textual support for the state failure, as opposed to a 
state action, reading of the amendment is the equal protection 
clause. That clause prohibits states from denying to persons within 
their jurisdiction the protection, the equal protection, of the laws. 
A state may deny protection either by direct legislative action or by 
failure of state executive agencies to supply effective protection. Re-
publican Senator Pool succinctly explained this theory of equal pro-
tection in the 1871 Ku Klux Klan debates: 
The protection of the laws can hardly be denied except by failure to execute 
them. While the laws are executed their protection is necessarily afforded. . . . The 
right to personal liberty or personal security can be protected only by the execution 
of the laws upon those who violate such rights. A failure to punish the offender is 
not only to deny to the person injured the protection of the laws, but to deprive him, 
in effect, of the rights, themselves. 36 
The equal protection clause then forbids the states from failing to 
supply protection. The main manifestation of such state failure and 
therefore of violation of the equal protection clause would be the 
35. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77-78 (1872): 
Was it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, by the simple declaration that no 
State should make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and protection of all 
the civil rights which we have mentioned [i.e., mainly those "fundamental rights" 
recited by Justice Washington in Cofield v. Coryell], from the States to the Federal 
government? And where it is declared that Congress shall have the power to enforce 
that article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain 
of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States? 
All this and more must follow, if the proposition of the plaintiffs in error be 
sound. For not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress whenever in 
its discretion any of them are supposed to be abridged by State legislation, but that 
body may also pass laws in advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of legisla-
tive power by the States, in their most ordinary and usual functions, as in its judg-
ment it may think proper on all such subjects. 
The major premise of the Court's argument here is just what we have maintained in the text: 
whatever the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship are, they are subject, by 
virtue of their inhering in U.S. citizenship, to congressional legislative control. The Court, 
for reasons that need not detain us here, was eager to restrict the range of national privileges 
and immunities, and thereby restrict congressional power, but it never denies a positive con-
gressional power over these national privileges and immunities. 
36. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. S.P. 608 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 552. 
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unpunished invasion of the rights of some private citizens by other 
private citizens. 
By section five Congress is authorized to enforce the provisions 
of the amendment, including, presumably, section one's equal pro-
tection guarantee. Now what form would congressional enforce-
ment of that guarantee take? In the simplest case, of course, it 
could require state officials to do their duty in supplying equal pro-
tection of the laws. But Congress could go further. The evil which 
the equal protection clause forbids is, in the final analysis, the pri-
vate violation of rights. The congressional power to enforce the 
equal protection clause, that is, to remedy the evil which the clause 
forbids, must extend to supplying the protection the state failed to 
provide. Section five gives Congress the power to enforce the rights 
affirmed in section one, which means in this context, the power to 
act against those private persons whose systematic and unpunished 
violations of the rights of others violate the guarantee to equal pro-
tection of the laws. 
Since Garfield has appeared thus far as a witness against the 
broader interpretation of congressional power under the amend-
ment, it is only proper to refer to him here as a witness on behalf of 
the theory of equal protection just propounded. In the following 
passage Garfield not only corroborates the state failure reading of 
the amendment, but also indicates the true grounds for his disagree-
ment with Bingham: 
[T]he chief complaint is not that the laws of the State are unequal, but that even 
where the laws are just and equal on their face, yet, by a systematic maladministra-
tion of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion of the 
people are denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a state of facts is 
clearly made out, I believe the last clause of the first section empowers Congress to 
step in and provide for doing justice to those persons who are thus denied equal 
protection. 
Now if the second section of the pending bill can be so amended that it shall 
clearly define this offense, as I have described it, and shall employ no terms which 
assert the power of Congress to take jurisdiction of the subject until such denial be 
clearly made, and shall not in any way assume the original jurisdiction of the rights 
of private persons and of property within the states-with these conditions clearly 
expressed in the section, I shall give it my hearty support. These limitations will not 
impair the efficiency of the section [i.e., they change absolutely nothing in the opera-
tion of the law, but change only its stated rationale], but will remove the serious 
objections that are entertained by many gentlemen to the section as it now stands.37 
The real brunt of his opposition in 1871 was the use to which some 
were putting the privileges and immunities clause. When Garfield 
insisted so much on an equal protection rather than a privileges and 
immunities rationale for the proposed legislation, he was attempting 
37. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. 153 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 529. 
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to maintain the remedial and secondary character of the congres-
sional power. 
E. THE CHANGERS 
The state failure interpretation of the amendment must con-
front some important, arguably contrary, evidence. The February 
draft did arouse explicit opposition from a group of men who feared 
its threat of overbearing congressional power, but who supported 
the final draft of the amendment.Js This group has figured promi-
nently in previous attempts to assess the meaning of the shift from 
the February to the final versions of the amendment. Garfield, for 
example, in 1871, "pointed out that no Republican opposed there-
vised draft on the same grounds that the original draft was opposed, 
namely giving Congress too much power. "39 A natural conclusion 
might be, then, that at least these men saw the two versions as dif-
fering significantly enough to overcome their objections to the Feb-
ruary draft. 40 
We looked earlier at Hotchkiss's objections to the February 
draft on the grounds of its "weakness." We must now look to his 
complaints about its strength. In addition to testing our conclu-
sions about congressional power, this will help us further to appre-
ciate Hotchkiss's key role in the deliberations. 
I understand the amendment as now proposed by its terms to authorize Con· 
gress to establish uniform laws throughout the United States upon the subject 
named, the protection of life, liberty and property. I am unwilling that Congress 
shall have any such power. 
38. This group includes those who have been identified as the "Opponents Test Case 
Vote Bloc," Table II supra, plus Hotchkiss and Conkling, who identified themselves as oppo-
nents of the February draft in the debate on it. 
39. Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act, supra note 5, at 347. This point, which perhaps 
needs to be slightly modified in the light of Hale's later testimony on his own stance towards 
the final version, seems to speak strongly against ten Broek's historical argument purporting 
to show that the federalism-inspired objections to the February draft had no impact on the 
final draft: "The destruction of the federal system certainly was pressed as an objection to the 
final, so-called negative form." He then cites various Congressmen who objected to the final 
draft on these grounds: "Since the amendment was adopted in the teeth of this criticism, 
might we not as reasonably conclude, if we are to give weight to the procedural record, that 
the amendment was intended to do the very thing objected to?" But the federalism objections 
to the final version were not raised by the Republicans who had had such objections to the 
February draft, but only by Democrats who, it is fairly clear, would have been prepared to 
object to even a thoroughly state-action amendment as working the destruction of the federal 
system. The continued Democratic opposition to the amendment seems far less significant 
than the fact that the Republicans, Hale perhaps excepted, ceased opposing it. 
40. Cf H. FLACK, supra note 4, at 83: the votes of Hale, Conkling, and Davis "may be 
explained by saying that the first section did not attempt to confer as much power as did the 
resolution which they opposed." Flack himself does not accept this hypothetical explanation, 
being of the opinion that both drafts confer plenary authority on Congress. He then more or 
less throws up his hands over the meaning of their actions. 
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Now, I desire that the very privileges for which the gentleman is contending 
shall be secured to the citizens; but I want them secured by a constitutional amend-
ment that legislation cannot override. Then if the gentleman wishes to go further, 
and provide by laws of Congress for the enforcement of these rights, I will go with 
him.41 
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Hotchkiss's position, then, cannot be taken, as some have done, as a 
straightforward objection to congressional power to reach private 
action.42 It is the power to pass uniform, primary legislation he 
opposes and not legislation reaching private action in itself. Davis 
of New York took much the same position as Hotchkiss. His main 
complaint against the February draft was that it "in terms" is "a 
grant for original legislation in Congress."43 
Hale of New York was the only other "changer" opposing the 
February draft who spoke enough during the debates for his 
thought to emerge with any clarity. As opposed to Davis and 
Hotchkiss, Hale's entire opposition to the February draft and its 
principle of congressional legislative power is very clear. The fol-
lowing exchange between him and Thaddeus Stevens is instructive: 
Hale: I submit that it is in effect a provision under which all State legislation, in its 
codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedure, affecting the individual 
citizen, ... may be repealed or abolished, and the law of Congress established 
instead. 
Stevens: Does the gentleman mean to say that, under this provision, Congress 
could interfere in any case where the legislation of a State was equal, impartial to 
all? Or is it not simply to provide that, where any State makes a distinction in the 
same law between different classes of individuals, Congress shall have power to cor-
rect such discrimination and inequality? Does this proposition mean anything more 
than that? 
Hale: In my judgment it does go much further than the remarks of the gentleman 
would imply; but even if it goes no further than that ... it is still open to the same 
objection, that it proposes an entire departure from the theory of the Federal Gov-
ernment in meddling with these matters of State jurisdiction.44 
Now that answer of Hale's is an objection not merely to the Febru-
ary draft, but also, it would seem, to the fourteenth amendment as 
adopted, and to the Civil Rights Bill of 1866. Hale's comment in 
1875, that he had opposed the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment, not just the February draft, makes perfect sense in conjunc-
tion with this reply to Stevens, even if his voting record does not 
perfectly accord with his later statement. His ultimate vote in favor 
of the Senate version of the amendment ought probably to be seen 
as accession to party pressure or other political concems.4s It was 
41. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. 1095 (1866), reprinted in Avins, at 160. 
42. E.g., Fairman, supra note 18, at 37. 
43. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. 1087 (1866), reprinted in Avins, at 156. 
44. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. 1063 (1866), reprinted in Avins, at 153. 
45. Cf M. BENEDICT, supra note 10, at 185-89. 
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clear to all that the fourteenth amendment was to be the leading 
element of the Republican platform in the upcoming congressional 
elections, and therefore a Northern Republican who had opposed 
the amendment would not stand well at election time.46 Hale's ulti-
mate vote for the amendment, after his opposition to the February 
draft, signifies nothing as to any substantial difference of meaning 
between the two drafts on the federalism issue.47 
Conkling also expressed his opposition to the February draft 
and then supported the amendment in its final form. Since he spoke 
very little, his actions are hard to interpret, but there is good reason 
to believe that he stood on the amendment much as Hale did. The 
evidence from the journal of the Joint Committee, of which Conk-
ling was a member, shows that Conkling had opposed Bingham's 
drafts all along, even after they were recast into the "no state shall" 
form; and that he finally gave Bingham his support only towards 
the very end of the Committee's deliberations, when it was well as-
sured that Bingham's draft would be part of the proposed amend-
ment, and then, in the House, when it was clear that the 
amendment would pass easily.4s The support Conkling gave to the 
final draft may well have been of the same character as that of Hale, 
and thus may signify nothing whatever as to his being more satisfied 
with the final draft than with the February draft.49 
46. Cf J. JAMES, supra note 7, at 181; G. MAYER, supra note 10. 
47. Here is his full statement in 1875: 
it was my fortune, standing alone in my party, to oppose the fourteenth amendment 
by my vote and by my voice, upon the ground, which seemed to me to be one I 
could not forsake, that it did change the constitutional powers of legislation of Con-
gress, that it changed the theory of our government, and introduced a range of 
legislation by Congress utterly lacking in the old Constitution or in any previous 
amendments to it except the thirteenth. 
I ask any lawyer on this floor to tell me where he finds authority to say that under 
those provisions Congress is limited to legislation to correct the action of States, to 
provide a tribunal which may review such action, and not for legislation in the first 
instance to remedy the great evil against which the amendment proposes to guard. 
CoNG. GLOBE, 43rd Cong., 2nd Sess. H.P. 979 (1875), reprinted in Avins, at 722-23. It is 
very clear then that Hale did not believe the shift in language to mean what Farnsworth took 
it to mean. He goes even further in the power he sees in the amendment than those who 
originally supported it did. Hale then cannot be taken as evidence that the change in form of 
the amendment was intended to meet objections of the pro-federalism forces. 
48. H. FLACK, supra note 4, at 55-139; J. JAMES, supra note 7, at 107-15. 
49. Table II identified four other Republican and Union Party possible opponents of the 
February draft-Kuykendall, Rollins, Marvin, and Phelps-all of whom eventually sup-
ported the final amendment at least once. None of the four spoke or in any other way made 
clear the meaning of his action. Whether any of these four fit into the Hotchkiss-Davis pat-
tern of support for the final version when the remedial character of congressional legislative 
power was more clearly expressed, or the Hale-Conkling pattern of continued opposition in 
principle but support for other reasons, or a third pattern of real perceived differences be-
tween the two versions, is more than the evidence allows us to say. But it is important to 
emphasize that the last alternative is only one of three possibilities and that it appears that at 
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The substance of my position on the original intention for con-
gressional power under the fourteenth amendment is now before the 
reader. What remains is to look at the later 1871 debates for cor-
roborative evidence. What follows, then, is chiefly of evidentiary 
value, and while it may help to clarify some fine points of constitu-
tional theory, it does not essentially change the argument. 
II. THE 1871 DEBATES 
The 1871 debates on the Ku Klux Klan Act provoked state-
ments and votes on congressional power from many of the original 
framers besides Bingham, Farnsworth, and Garfield. Of course, we 
must be cautious in what we infer from those later debates. Men 
misremember their deeds, much less their thoughts, of five years 
before; or they change their minds. Or they have a motive for not 
remembering accurately. But if the 1871 evidence is uniform in its 
testimony, and if this harmonizes well with what is otherwise 
known of 1866-it is fairly unlikely that so many men should all 
misremember or distort the past in the same way, after all-then we 
can, I think, take that testimony as corroborative and strengthening 
our independently derived knowledge. 
The situation in which the Ku Klux Klan Act was prepared 
was almost perfect, as the situation in 1866 was not, for bringing 
out the implications in the fourteenth amendment for congressional 
power. The evil with which Congress was concerned was violence 
and intimidation by private individuals whom the states either 
would not or could not control. Even in the milder form finally 
adopted, the bill had provisions aimed at any "two or more persons 
within any State or Territory of the United States. "so Here was a 
clear case of Congress attempting to reach the actions of private 
individuals, actions which before the Constitution was amended 
would most assuredly have been held to be within the exclusive do-
main of State authorities. 
A. THE VoTE ON THE KKK ACT 
In 1871, twenty-eight of those who had been in the House dur-
ing the thirty-ninth Congress still sat in either the House or the 
Senate. Accepting the KKK Act as a test vote on the intentions of 
the framers of the fourteenth amendment on the question of con-
gressional power, let us see how these twenty-eight voted in 1871. 
most four Congressmen followed that pattern, and none ever openly spoke for that position. 
So for them as we can reliably say anything about our group of "changers," they not only do 
not shake the state failure interpretation, but actually add more support to it. 
50. 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
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TABLE VI: THE "CONTINUERS":* POSITION ON THE 
KKK ACT AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Vote on KKK Bill** 
Yea Nay No Vote 
Supporters of 
Fourteenth Amendment 19 0 3 
Opponents of 
Fourteenth Amendment 0 6 0 
* Five of the twenty-eight "continuers" were in the Senate in 1871. (Ferry, Windom, 
Patterson, Conkling, Morrill.) The other twenty-three remained in the House of 
Representatives. 
** For those in the House, the roll-call used to establish position on the KKK Bill is that 
on the final House version of the bill, April 6, 1871. Likewise, for those in the Senate, 
the roll-call on the Senate version before conference has been used, April 14, 1871. In 
both Houses, later roll-calls are a bit confused by the interjection of the issue of the 
Senate-passed but House-opposed Sherman Amendment. This amendment is irrelevant 
to our present concern. 
TABLE VII: THE "CONTINUERS": PARTY VOTE ON 
THE KKK ACT 
Republicans 
Democrats 
Yea 
19 
0 
Nay 
0 
6 
No Vote 
3 
0 
Tables VI and VII show the pattern of the 1871 vote, both with 
respect to previous positions on the fourteenth amendment, and to 
political party. All voting Congressmen who had voted for the 
amendment also voted for the bill, including Farnsworth and Gar-
field. Also among the nineteen Republicans supporting the bill was 
Roscoe Conkling. If the vote on the bill was a "test vote," five years 
later, on what the Congress of 1866 had meant, the result supported 
Bingham's readings of those events, rather than Farnsworth's. 
But Farnsworth's presence, and perhaps Conkling's, in the 
KKK majority raises doubts about whether the KKK Act, as voted 
on, represented a "test vote." The Farnsworth-Bingham-Garfield 
debates which we have already discussed were provoked by an ear-
lier version of the bill, the second section of which provided: 
That if two or more persons shall, within the limits of any State, band or conspire 
together to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of another 
person, which, being committed within a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the United States. would, under any law of the United States then in force 
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constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter. mayhem, robbery. assault and 
battery. perjury. subornation of perjury, criminal obstruction of legal process or resist-
ance of officers in discharge of official duty. arson, or larceny .... 51 
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In light of constitutional misgivings about this formulation, the lan-
guage of the bill as adopted was substituted. The question that 
arises is whether the change obviates the value of the bill as a "test 
vote." Recently Alfred Avins has argued that this was precisely the 
case. 
B. THE A VINS THEORY 
A vins identifies four clear positions that emerged in the 1871 
debates on congressional power. Two of these are of special rele-
vance. He describes one theory as follows: 
If a state denies by affirmative action or omission the equal protection of the laws, 
whether the denial or failure is due to the action or inaction of the legislature, exec-
utive, or courts, and thus fails to protect persons in their constitutional rights, Con-
gress may substitute directly federal protection for the state protection withheld. 
Avins identifies this as "the original theory of [the] bill."52 This 
theory is very close to what we have argued to be the actual inten-
tion of the amendment, but is expressed a bit too narrowly as simply 
an equal protection theory. The theory of the amendment defended 
here is broader and more general, applying to all the clauses of the 
amendment and expressing a general theory of federal relations, 
"national government, decentralized administration." 
A vins argues that this theory was rejected in the final bill and 
replaced by another theory of Congress's power. According to this 
second theory, Congress is not altogether precluded from reaching 
the actions of private individuals, but can do so only under ex-
tremely limited circumstances: 
Congress may also punish a private person or conspiracy. When engaged in 
preventing a state officer from performing his constitutional duty of affording equal 
protection either by violence or threats thereof against the state officer, or by induc-
ing him in some other way not to afford equal protection, such as through a con-
spiracy with him. 
The state action requirement under this theory is breached to the 
rather small extent that it is 
on the same basis as punishing a combination to deter a federal revenue collector 
from collecting revenue by violence or by bribery or conspiracy .... The constitu-
tional theory was that Congress could punish individuals who thwarted officials 
from performing a federally-imposed duty. 
51. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 68-69 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
493-94 (emphasis supplied.) 
52. Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act, supra note 5, at 377. 
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This theory, according to Avins, was the one "ultimately embodied 
in the bill," and was the theory which had the support of most of 
those involved in the drafting of the fourteenth amendment.53 He 
concludes, therefore, that if the 1871 proceedings cast any "re-
flected light" on the original intention, the theory he identifies as 
that of the Ku Klux Klan Act is also that of section five.54 
The text of the bill does not support Avins's theory. Section 
two of the act as adopted does make it unlawful for 
two or more persons [to] ... conspire ... for the purpose of preventing or hindering 
the constituted authorities of any State from giving or securing to all persons within 
such State the equal protection of the laws, ... or to injure any person or his 
property for lawfully enforcing the right of any person or class of persons to the 
equal protection of the laws ... each and every person so offending shall be guilty 
of ... . 55 
But in addition to acting against those who interfere with the "con-
stituted authorities," the law also provides against conspiracies "for 
the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or 
class of persons, of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal 
privileges or immunities under the laws." This provision goes alto-
gether beyond what Avins identifies as the theory of the law; in-
deed, it goes at least as far as the theory A vins claims was rejected, 
and perhaps further than any remedial theory of congressional ac-
tion under section five. The very sweeping language of this section 
would later contribute to its difficulties in the Supreme Court.56 
A close examination of the debates also fails to support A vins. 
Seven Republicans, including Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio, the 
sponsor of the original bill, and Burton Cook of Illinois, the chief 
draftsman of the amended bill, spoke on the bill in its amended 
form. The theory of the bill ought to emerge most clearly in these 
53. /d. at 377-78. 
54. Avins apparently pressed this argument on the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), and United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966), where it was 
rejected. But it can hardly be said that the Court met the argument or presented either a very 
clear statement of the position it was adopting instead, or any very compelling grounds in 
defense of its position. 
55. 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
56. Avins, strangely I think, admits at the end of his article that "although the theory 
ultimately adopted was that the violence would have to direct its force against a public official 
to deter him or prevent him from affording protection, the statutory language did not make 
this clear, but instead proscribed conspiracies to deny protection generally." Avins, The Ku 
Klux Klan Act, supra note 5, at 379. Indeed it did-and not only did it speak in such general 
language, it used that general language in addition to the more specific language directed to 
conspiracies against public officials. It is difficult then to see, as A vins does, "vagueness of 
language" as the reason for this quite general statutory language. /d. But Avins believes he 
knows from the debates what the theory, as opposed to the language, of the bill really is. So 
we must see if the "theory," as stated in debate, supports Avins"s position. 
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speeches. Shellabarger, in introducing Cook's amendments to the 
bill, described "the object of the amendment" as follows: 
The object of the amendment is, as interpreted by its friends who brought it before 
the House, so far as I understand it, to confine the authority of this law to the 
prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights of American 
citizens: that any violation of the right, the animus and effect of which is to strike 
down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted 
with his and other citizens' rights, shall be within the scope of the remedies of this 
section. 57 
The change Shellabarger saw in the bill concerns the scope or char-
acter of the right to be protected by national legislation. The new 
version of the bill attempted to avoid some of the seemingly extreme 
implications of the earlier bill by affirming that it is not the rights 
and the privileges and immunities as such that are sought to be pro-
tected, but equality of rights and equality of privileges and immuni-
ties. This new language conveyed somewhat better than the old the 
relatively limited aim that inspired the legislation. Shellabarger, 
then, in introducing the bill, provided no support for A vins's read-
ing of the bill's theory. 
Nor did the next Republican speaker, Jeremiah Wilson of Indi-
ana, support it any better. As Avins himself concedes, Wilson 
"made a sweeping assertion that Congress could enforce the Consti-
tution against conspirators," and believed that was what the bill at-
tempted to do.ss Cook of Illinois spoke after Wilson, and since he 
was the draftsman of the amendment, A vins rightly lays great em-
phasis on his exposition. According to A vins, 
Cook's amendment, in his own view, which Shellabarger adopted, punished only 
conspiracies to obstruct state officials in performing their constitutional duty of af-
fording all persons equal protection. It did not punish conspiracies to commit 
crimes against individuals, even if such crimes were motivated by a desire to deprive 
them of equal protection. 59 
Cook opened his explanation by stating that Congress has the 
power "to protect and enforce every right secured to American citi-
zens by the Constitution of the United States," but this power does 
not include the "right to punish an assault and battery when com-
mitted by two or more persons within a State." A Democratic op-
ponent of the bill inquired why, under Cook's theory of 
congressional power, Congress could not reach assault and battery 
and other crimes against person and property, to which Cook 
replied: 
57. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. 478 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 536. 
58. Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act, supra note 5, at 351-52. 
59. Id. at 353. 
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The reason is that the Constitution of the United States recognizes these rights 
as being enforced and protected by the State authorities. [Note that he does not say 
exclusively, however.] It recognizes in one event the right of the United States to 
interfere and protect the citizen in person and property, when, by unlawful combi-
nations too strong for the State authorities to put down or subdue, the citizen is 
deprived of his rights. 60 
This exposition is indeed a rather clear statement of the theory of 
the fourteenth amendment, as described above, and which, accord-
ing to A vins, was rejected in the bill. 
Ulysses Mercur of Pennsylvania, one of the carryover Con-
gressmen from 1866, was the next Republican speaker. He was, 
Avins concedes, a defender of the equal protection theory suppos-
edly rejected by the House.6I Charles Willard, who was not in Con-
gress in 1866, is nonetheless awarded special prominence by Avins. 
He claimed to have supplied the original draft on which the 
amended bill was based, and was one of the few who stated clearly 
that he considered the original bill unconstitutional but the 
amended bill constitutional. Willard's objection to the original bill 
derived from his belief that in it Congress claimed "original juris-
diction of all offenses against life, property, or person, although 
such offenses might be committed within the limits of a State."62 
The new bill, by contrast, and here is the source of Shellabarger's 
comments, avoids this extraordinarily broad and unconstitutional 
claim. 
By providing that the essence of the crime should consist in the intent to deprive a 
person of the equal protection of the laws and of equal privileges and immunities 
under the laws; in other words, that the Constitution secured, and was only in-
tended to secure, equality of rights and immunities, and that we could only punish 
by United States law a denial of that equality.63 
Indeed this is a more restricted claim than that which, according to 
Willard, the original bill raised. But it is not restricted in the way 
A vins claims. 
The last two speakers before the vote on the bill supply the 
only support in the entire set of debates for A vins's position: even 
their statements were ambiguous. Horatio Burchard, like Willard, 
very strongly of the opinion that the revised bill cured the constitu-
tional defects of the original, explained the superiority of the new 
draft as follows. 
That amendment [to the bill] obviates in a great measure the objections and the 
60. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. 485 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 538. 
61. Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act, supra note 5, at 353-54, 377. 
62. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 188 (1871). reprinted in Avins, at 
540. 
63. /d. 
1986] STATE ACTION 
doubtful construction as to the extent of jurisdiction for the punishment of crimes 
intended by the bill. It is not denial of protection, but of equality of protection 
which constitutes the offense against the United States. The conspiracies it seeks to 
punish are those designed to prevent the equal and impartial administration of jus-
tice. These are essentially different from combinations and conspiracies to resist the 
execution of ordinary process. They must be aimed to prevent the enjoyment of 
equal civil rights. 
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In this, Burchard's exposition is perhaps identical to Willard's, but 
he concludes in a way that comes very close to A vins's position. 
The gravamen of the offense is the unlawful attempt to prevent a State through its 
officers enforcing in behalf of a citizen of the United States his constitutional right 
to equality of protection. It is with this view that this legislation is competent .... 
If the refusal of a State officer, acting for the State, to accord equality of civil rights 
renders him amenable to punishment for the offense under United States law, con-
spirators who attempt to prevent such officers from performing such duty are also 
clearly liable. 64 
The possible ambiguity that appears between the first part of 
Burchard's remarks and the second is reflective perhaps of a deeper 
ambiguity inherent in the theory that what Congress may punish is 
"the unlawful attempt to prevent a State through its officers enforc-
ing in behalf of a citizen of the United States his constitutional 
rights to equality of protection." The ambiguity appears when one 
asks how a conspiracy, which we might for the sake of convenience 
call a conspiracy against (or with) state officials differs from a con-
spiracy against a citizen. From one point of view, the difference is 
great. A state official either would have to be part of the conspir-
acy, or his actions, his failure to supply equal protection, would 
have to be demonstrably affected by threats or actions taken by the 
private conspirators on or against him. Avins seems to be defend-
ing this view of the matter. 
But from another point of view, "the unlawful attempt to pre-
vent a state through its officers, etc." might make the conspiracy 
against the state officials quite indistinguishable from the conspiracy 
against the citizen. Could it not be said to be an ipso facto conspir-
acy against the state's supplying equal protection to conspire to de-
prive citizens of equal rights? After all, any criminal conspiracy 
normally encompasses an intent to avoid the interference of the law 
with its operations. On this view point, the theory that A vins 
claims was rejected-the state failure theory-and the theory he 
claims was accepted are identical in effect, although differing some-
what in the constitutional reasoning which supports them. 
Burchard probably had something like this in mind. If not, it is 
64. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 315 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
546. 
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difficult to see how he defended the bill as actually drafted. 
Whatever interpretation of Burchard's theory may be correct, it was 
sufficiently idiosyncratic that it cannot be taken as indicative of the 
congressional understanding either of the theory of the KKK Bill, 
or of section five of the fourteenth amendment.6s 
Surprisingly, Avins cites both Bingham and Garfield as promi-
nent among those who supported his conspiracy theory of the four-
teenth amendment.66 Avins's treatment of Bingham is altogether 
remarkable. In an article which concludes with the observation 
that the Supreme Court in the Guest case improperly "resurrected 
the rejected first draft of the Bingham amendment from its grave 
and enshrined it in all of its glory into the fourteenth amendment" 
A vins inexplicably fails to mention Bingham's claim that the 
amendment as adopted went as far as the earlier draft had done in 
empowering Congress. In considering Bingham's position, one 
must consider further that he spoke in favor of the earlier Shel-
labarger draft, of which he expressed no constitutional doubts 
whatever. He says, quite explicitly, that the post-war amendments 
"do, in my judgment, vest in Congress a power to protect the rights 
of citizens against States, and individuals in States." The KKK Bill 
is an instance of the power to provide "against the denial of rights 
by states, whether the denial be acts of omission or commission, as 
well as against the unlawful acts of combinations and conspiracies 
against the rights of the people." "Who dare say," Bingham asks, 
"now that the Constitution has been amended, that the nation can-
not by law provide against all such abuses and denials of right as 
these in States, and by States, or combinations of persons?"67 
A vins says of Garfield that he 
observed that Congress had the power to enforce the amendment under the fifth 
section by making it a penal offense for any person, whether official or private to 
invade the rights of citizens or by violence, threats or intimidation to deprive him of 
his rights, as a part of that general power vested in Congress to punish the violators 
of its laws. 
But of this very broad position, A vins says, "In other words, a pri-
vate criminal who interferes with the state in giving equal protec-
tion would be, in his view, punishable by federal authority." Those 
are "other words" indeed. 
Examination of A vins's views on the KKK Act confirms the 
65. Poland, who spoke after Burchard, is the only other representative who seems to 
agree with Burchard's theory, and in his explication there is the same ambiguity as in 
Burchard's own. 
66. Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act. supra note 5, at 378. 
67. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. H. P. app. 85 (1871), reprinted in Avins, at 
511. 
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propriety of taking the vote on the KKK Act as in some sense a 
"test vote" on the congressional understanding of the meaning of 
the shift in the language of the fourteenth amendment from the 
February draft to the final draft. The bill as adopted, the theory of 
the bill as presented by its advocates, and the statements and votes 
of those who were part of the thirty-ninth Congress all support the 
state failure theory of congressional power under the fourteenth 
amendment. 
But neither the thirty-ninth Congress which drafted the 
amendment nor the forty-second Congress which reaffirmed the 
original understanding of the amendment had the last word. 
Shortly after the 1871 debates, the Supreme Court began its attack 
on the fourteenth amendment as originally understood. The Court 
rejected, preeminently, the doctrine of congressional power meant 
to be embodied in section five, and substituted for it the state action 
doctrine. What the Court did was partly due to difficulties inherent 
in the state failure doctrine. But those difficulties and the Court's 
subsequent reshaping of the fourteenth amendment constitute an-
other long story. 
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APPENDIX I 
Rollins of New Hampshire has been included in the "oppo-
nents test-case bloc" even though he did not vote for Eldridge's mo-
tion, but abstained. He has been classified as a member of the bloc, 
however, because he is the only Republican who abstained on this 
vote but voted immediately after on Conkling's motion to postpone. 
That suggests that he used his abstention, in the face of his party's 
position on the motion, to signal his disapproval of the February 
draft. 
One Republican who voted for the Eldridge motion has been 
omitted from the bloc. That is Lowell Rousseau of Kentucky, a 
Republican in name only, who supported the Democratic position 
on all votes relating to the fourteenth amendment. His opposition 
to the February draft, like that of the Democrats, cannot be differ-
entiated from general opposition to the amendment in any form. It 
therefore is no help to us in trying to understand the significance of 
the shift in language from the February draft to the final version.6s 
APPENDIX II 
As Table III shows, Julian and Raymond did not vote on the 
motion to postpone, contrary to their party's position, after having 
voted against the motion to table. Lowell Rousseau also abstained 
from the vote on the motion to postpone, but since he had previ-
ously favored the motion to table, his abstention on the second vote 
clearly meant something different from the others. As with Rollins 
in the "opponents test-case bloc," we feel justified in attributing 
some significance to the abstentions of Julian and Raymond. They 
(and Rousseau) were the only Congressmen who voted on one of 
the two roll-call votes and did not vote on the other. All the other 
abstainers-there were over thirty on each roll-call-abstained on 
both. With the exception of one Representative, whose views were 
announced by a colleague, we are unable to attribute reliably any 
views to this larger group of abstainers. But to attribute significance 
to the abstentions of those who voted on one motion and not the 
other, especially when we have later fourteenth amendment votes as 
corroborative evidence, does not seem improper. 
68. On Rousseau's general political position, seeM. BENEDICT, supra note 10, at 184, 
349, 354. 
